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Introduction
Financial crises have not declined in number, frequency or severity over the last two decades, rather the contrary (Bordo et al., 2001) . Each crisis causes enormous costs in the countries concerned. Even if many crises may help to promote overdue structural change, they are costly and it is a worthwhile objective to realize adjustments without this heavy toll. Thus, international financial institutions invest in researching early warning systems (EWS). 2 There is now a wide range of studies available, however, without real converging results: studies vary in coverage of countries and time, they apply different methods and they may even define crises quite differently. So are there any robust findings that might help policy makers? This paper does not add another EWS to the existing body of literature but systematically analyzes the robustness of main approaches. It is shown that, indeed, most findings critically depend on their empirical design. EWSs are a somewhat dubious subject from this perspective. However, there also emerge robust lessons that help us to better understand and implement EWSs.
The modern approaches to understanding determinants of currency crises started in the early 1990s. The largely unexpected shake-up of the European Monetary System in 1992/93 motivated Wyplosz (1995, 1996) .
Thereafter, attention focused more on developing countries (Frankel and Rose, 1996) , spurred by the Mexican crisis (e.g. Sachs, Tornell and Velasco, 1996) and, above all, by the Asian crisis (e.g. Kaminsky, 1998 , Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart, 1998 , Berg and Pattillo, 1999 ). More currency crises followed, e.g. major ones in Russia and Argentina, stimulating ongoing research in common factors and an optimal EWS design. In the beginning, efforts were directed into analyzing an increasing set of variables, collecting larger samples and introducing multivariate techniques.
Recent trends in this field point towards further modifications in method, such as applying a multinomial logit approach (Bussiere and Fratzscher, 2002) , a Markov
Switching approach (Martinez-Peria, 2002 , Abiad, 2003 and extreme value theory to identify crises (Pozo and Amuedo-Dorantes, 2003) . Another trend is towards focusing on regional studies, such as Esquivel and Larrain (1999) , Brueggemann and Linne (2002) or Pasternak (2003) .
The universe of proposed EWSs thus stretches over five dimensions: variables, sample period, sample countries, crisis definition and method applied. Each EWS is a combination regarding these five dimensions, so that -due to focus and product differentiation -usually, results cannot be compared to each other. Moreover, most studies do not present extensive robustness checks, so it is not clear which improvement claimed will last under different conditions. There is thus an obvious need to make results comparable. It is, however, also obvious that due to the complexity involved, restrictions are needed. Fortunately, several earlier studies have carefully analyzed the usefulness of variables and found that variables often point in the same direction, in particular in a multivariate approach. As, moreover, all variables are rather more able to give a warning signal of a possible upcoming crisis than predict the timing and exact occurrence of the latter, a selection of few meaningful fundamental indicators will work (Salvatore, 1999) . In this respect we follow the suggestion of Berg and Pattillo (1999, p. 573 et sqq.) to rely on their handful of variables only.
Regarding the issue of robustness, Edison (2003) is the most complete study published. She basically extends the leading indicator work of Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998) -in short: KLR -in four of the five dimensions mentioned above, although with different intensity. Our study also departs from KLR, who presented the broadest approach at that time and has thus been a benchmark study until today. Going beyond Edison (2003) , we systematically apply several methods to
generate warning signals, we analyze the influence of crisis definition more thoroughly and we consider some recent proposals to improve forecasting power of EWSs.
We find, as did Berg and Pattillo (1999) and Edison (2003) , that it becomes more difficult over time to replicate earlier crisis dates. So the dependent variable may change from study to study even if all parameters are kept the same. Fortunately, this haziness in data does not seem to influence results too much. Berg and Pattillo (1999) show that a logit approach can improve results of EWSs. To some extent, this holds for our extensions, too. We test their logit model with variables given as number as well as with variables given in a reduced 0-1-form.
The two approaches do not differ that much although the reduced form yields some-what better results. One surprise is, however, the implementation of the multinomial logit proposed by Bussiere and Fratzscher (2002) . This technique does not provide the expected useful forecasting results when applied out-of-sample but seems to depend decisively on the underlying data.
Regarding the crisis definition, it is found that the choice between the several definitions offered by the literature is non-trivial. The simplest Frankel and Rose (1996) -in short: FR -proposal does not cover typical problems in industrialized countries well. The complex Bussiere and Fratzscher (2002) -in short BF -measure proves to be stable over time and country extensions but is, due to its construction, less sensitive to country-specific characteristics. Furthermore, lack of data can be critical. It is thus the KLR measure which seems most practical.
Further examinations on EWS parameters in order to improve forecasting ability reveal that there are indeed options available: we find that the recent trend in the literature towards focussing on regional EWS has some justification in the sense that it helps to improve forecasts. Finally, due to instability over time, shorter samples also tend to provide better forecasts. One should be aware, however, that regional EWSs as well as shorter samples tend to homogenize the problem: explanations are thus "better" because they are easier and not necessarily because one would understand better.
In summary, our understanding of EWSs -which basically aim at predicting larger exchange rate changes -may be guided by core insights from the empirical exchange rate literature: fundamentals matter but their influence is small and unstable Rose, 1995, Sarno and Taylor, 2002) . Keeping these limitations in mind, there emerge five lessons: First, EWSs have robust forecasting power and thus help policy-makers to prevent crises. Second, competing crisis definitions have pros and cons but the KLR crisis definition is most practical. Third, take a logit model to condense information from various fundamental variables. Fourth, add a regional contagion dummy to the standard set of about five variables. Fifth, one may be tempted to address instability over time and countries by taking shorter samples and regional EWSs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents our extension of the KLR approach over time and countries. Section 3 examines the advantageousness of several logit approaches compared to the composite indicator. The pros and cons of various crisis definitions are analyzed in Section 4. Further approaches to improve forecasts are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
KLR-extensions over time and countries

Reproducing the KLR approach
In order to tie up to previous research and assure data consistency, we begin our robustness analyses with a replication effort of the benchmark KLR approach.
Starting with the crisis definition, KLR use an index of exchange market pressure (in short: EMPI) for each country that is constructed as a weighted average of monthly percentage changes in the nominal exchange rate (NER) and in gross international reserves (RES). These two components are weighted in such a way that they have the same conditional variance. Reflecting the pressure on the currency as an increase of the index, either due to a currency's depreciation or due to a loss of international reserves, a crisis (C) is considered a period in which the EMPI is more than three standard deviations above its country-specific mean. KLR and Edison (2003) as well as the results of our own replications.
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After determining the crisis dates, the next step consists of choosing meaningful indicators to give a warning signal when crossing a formerly designed threshold 3 All data used derive from the IMF international financial statistics (IFS). When trying to reproduce the crises, 2.5 standard deviations instead of 3 above the EMPI mean appear to be most applicable. Our proceedings align with Edison (2003, p. 11) . Nevertheless, the results are quite astonishing: KLR identify 75 crises, Edison finds 70 in the same sample, but only 47 of them match exactly with the ones of KLR. Our replication identifies 79 crisis, 36 of them correspond exactly to the original ones, 45 to the replication by Edison. Berg and Pattillo (1999, p. 565) , who as well replicate the KLR benchmark, assign these discrepancies to differences in the raw data resulting from data revisions and individual data "cleaning". Taking into account that the latter fail to match 14 out of the 75 KLR crises only one year later while Edison misses 28 three years afterwards, our results five years later appear reasonable. In order to create an easy-to-handle model we choose the set of 6 variables proposed and statistically verified by Berg and Pattillo (1999) , namely deviation of real exchange rate from trend, growth of international reserves, of exports, and of M2 to international reserves, as well as current account to GDP and M2 to international reserves in levels (for details about the construction of the variables, see Annex 2).
Following Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995) , Figure 1 Second, all six indicators keep their forecasting power with a noise-to-signal ratio smaller than one (see Table 1 , columns 1-3). Furthermore, indicators mainly keep their performance relative to each other with the real exchange rate variable staying the best performer.
Expanding KLR over countries
Following Edison (2003) , we also consider 8 additional countries which experienced at least one currency crisis. Differently from extensions in a time dimension, additional countries have no influence on the crisis identification as the respective EMPI and standard deviations are calculated separately for each country. Annex 1 shows the identified crisis periods for the expanded sample: 104 for the shorter period and 126 for the extended period . 
Forecasting out-of-sample
Up to now, we have only considered the performance of univariate indicators insample. However, in order to assess the applicability of our variables to form an EWS, we should assess two further aspects. In a second step, we follow the idea of Kaminsky (1998, p. 14 et sqq.) . Having looked at each indicator separately so far, we combine the information provided by all variables to a composite indicator:
Accordingly, the different indicator signals are summed up (Σ S ) and weighted with their inverse noise-to-signal ratio (1/ ω) each). Depending on the number of variables signaling, the composite indicator can take different values. As pure values of the composite indicator do not say anything about the crisis probability, the associated (conditional) probabilities have to be calculated.
In a third step, finally, the in-and out-of-sample performance can be assessed.
When comparing the composite indicator with the best univariate indicator, the real exchange rate, two aspects emerge: First, in general, results out-of-sample are (as expected) worse in comparison to the in-sample consideration. Second, the composite indicator clearly outperforms the univariate benchmark, especially out-of-sample.
As presumed, it is thus worthwhile to continue to work with the combined information of different indicators. Our results align with those of Goldstein, Kaminsky, and Reinhart (2000, p. 64 et sqq.) , and are hence not explicitly displayed here.
From composite indicators to logit models
In this section, we go beyond the univariate KLR indicator approach and the composite indicator as a step towards a multivariate framework. We analyze whether multivariate logit models outperform former approaches and which among them might be most appropriate for practical purposes.
Two logit model alternatives
Describing the crisis probability as a non-linear function of different variables, Table 2 shows the two estimated logit models. In both models, the same four variables are significant at the 1% level and their coefficients show the expected and correct signs. 5 The odds ratio also displayed permits us to draw conclusions with regard to the conditional probability. If in the binomial logit model with binary signals e.g. the exports variable, emits a signal, the crisis probability is about 62.1 % higher than without the signal. Again, the real exchange rate variable shows the highest conditional probability.
As before, we are not only interested in in-sample, but also in out-of-sample results: Our performance assessment both in-and out-of-sample of the two logit alternatives in comparison to the composite indicator can be found in Table 3 . In order to assure comparability, we reduce the latter to exactly the same four variables entering the binomial logit models. Following Berg and Pattillo (1999) , we take the two alternative cut-off probabilities of 25% and 50% to issue a signal. As the objective of an EWS consists in properly forecasting upcoming crises, the percentage of crises called correctly can probably be considered the most important criterion. However, without taking into account the number of false alarms as well, a performance assessment is only half-hearted.
At first sight, the trade-off between correctly called crises and false alarms becomes obvious and can be seen as valid over all different approaches. Let us take a closer look at the in-sample performance of the binary logit with variables entering in the form of binary signals, for example: using the 50% cut-off, the last model provides an obviously better performance compared to the other two models as far as correctly signaled crises as well as false alarms are concerned. Bringing the cut-off probability down to 25%, the number of correctly called crisis periods is augmented to 53% -but at the cost of more false alarms. The models are thus difficult to compare. Out-of-sample, performance results once again worsen compared to in-sample estimations. Furthermore, with a 50% cut-off, the composite indicator shows the best performance. However, applying a 25% cut-off, it is the binomial logit model with signals which shows a higher percentage of correctly called crises as well as less false alarms. So taking the four cases considered in Table 3 as the benchmark, each of the three models is best in one case but only the binary logit model is never the worst.
Though performance results are not unambiguous, the binary logit model seems to perform most robustly.
The multinomial logit
So far, the dependent variable could either take a value of 1, representing a crisis period, or 0 for tranquil times. We thus assumed variables to behave differently in crisis and non-crisis times. However, reality is more complex. Variables seem not only to deviate from their normal level before but also noticeably after a crisis (see Figure 1 ). Accordingly, instead of comparing only two states (crisis and non-crisis times), an EWS could also address what can be called a "post-crisis bias".
To our knowledge, Bussiere and Fratzscher (2002) Taking three states into account would presuppose that a mean value comparison of the possible three states displays significant differences. The results of our analyses for the six indicators shown in Table 4 confirm this. Considering, for example, the real exchange rate variable 24 months before and after a crisis respectively, a significant difference in mean values becomes obvious. Whereas the average value in crisis times is -7.654 and thus implies a negative deviation from the trend, representing an overvalued local currency, the mean value for the crisis itself and the 24 months after the crisis is 10.608. Alternatively, the time window is shortened to two times 12 months, but results stay consistent over all variables (and are thus not presented here).
Aiming to assess whether a multinomial logit can really improve crisis recognition and forecast, Table 5 sheds light on both in-and out-of-sample performance of the different types of logit models. In order to make results comparable, we use the same four variables for the multinomial as for the binomial logit model. 6 Three aspects emerge when comparing the multinomial logit model with the binomial one: First of all, considering both the 25% and 50% cut-off probabilities in sample, it is worth doubting whether a multinomial logit model generally improves forecasting performance. Different from Bussiere and Fratzscher (2002) , we do not find superior performance results in comparison to our binomial logit model. Second, out-of-sample using a 50% cut-off, the multinomial model seems slightly better than the binomial model regarding crisis periods correctly called and false alarms. However, results are not at all convincing when considering the 25% cut-off probability. 6 For the construction of the multinomial logit model, we rely on Bussiere and Fratzscher (2002, p. 19 et sqq.) . Like them, we choose the tranquil regime as the base regime. We estimate the probabilities of being rather in the tranquil period or in a (pre-)crisis or a recovery period according to changes in the independent variables. Each observation can be assigned to the state with the highest probability. However, in order to take different cut-off probabilities into account, we also include different cutoff thresholds for signalling a pre-crisis state. In Table 5 , the performance results of our estimated multinomial logit model are thus compared with those of the binomial logit model using a 25% and a 50% cut-off probability respectively.
Third, a binomial logit model is easier to implement as an EWS and we thus decide to continue our work relying on the binomial logit with variables entering in binary form to be the best performing method. We now explicitly consider different crisis definitions presented in the literature.
The impact of different crisis definitions
Obviously, the robustness question also applies to the kind of crisis definition used. Though this part of an EWS can be considered as a more philosophical issue as either someone believes something is a crisis or not, there can be at least three different kinds of crisis definitions found in the literature, which comprise between one and three variables. Moreover, the interpretation of concrete values to be reached before a crisis is called differ from study to study. We compare and analyze the proposals of Frankel and Rose (1996) and Bussiere and Fratzscher (2002) with KLR concerning robustness and stability.
Applying the crisis definition of Frankel and Rose (FR)
FR concentrate their study explicitly on currency crashes when analyzing 105
developing countries on an annual data basis between 1971 and 1992. In contrast to KLR, who include both international reserves and the exchange rate -and thus account for averted as well as successful attacks on the domestic currency, FR focus on the latter. According to their definition, a crisis is considered a period of a nominal exchange rate (NER) devaluation of at least 25%. Additionally, in order to take hyperinflation into account, at the same time this has to comply an exceeding of the previous year's change in the exchange rate by at least 10%. 
U
They admit that their cut-off points are somewhat arbitrary but sensitivity analyses support the settings. The idea of adding a second criterion is supported by Esquivel and Larrain (1999, p. 8) who also try to ensure in their work that only meaningful currency devaluations (in the sense of those effecting the purchasing power parity) are considered as crises.
We apply the FR definition to the original KLR sample as well as to the enlarged country sample, both from 1970 to 1995 and to 2002 respectively. Because the crisis definition has no sample dependent elements, in contrast to the KLR definition, neither sample extensions nor expansions should have any impact on the identified crisis in the small sample. Due to our use of monthly instead of annual data, we have to allow for some small modifications in the crisis definition: Both criteria, the 25% devaluation as well as the 10% change, apply to monthly instead of annual reference.
Furthermore, we correspondingly shorten the proposed 3-year windowing by FR (1996, p. 358) to three months.
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Annex 1 (column 6) shows our results. We identify 84 crisis periods in the extended KLR sample when using the modified FR definition. It is conspicuous that neither in Colombia, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Spain nor in Malaysia and Thailand, are crisis times detected, whereas our calculations using the KLR definition identify 32 crisis dates in these countries. In order to counteract an unavoidable bias when including countries that did not experience at least one crisis between 1970 and 1995, we drop those countries from further analyses. Results of our binomial logit model with variables in the binary 0-1 7 The transformation from yearly to monthly data is of course arbitrary. Godfjan and Valdés (1998) , for example, take a 2-month window when reproducing Frankel and Rose. 8 Expanding the original KLR sample to 28 countries reveals a similar picture: In Greece, India, Portugal and Singapore no crises can be identified. Additional countries thus only augment the number of identified crisis periods by 4 to 88 crises in the large extended sample.
form are displayed in Table 3 for comparison).
However, out-of-sample, with coefficients gained for the in-sample periods and then 
The crisis definition of Bussiere and Fratzscher (BF)
Whereas FR reduce the KLR definition to the exchange rate focus, BF enlarge it by additionally considering interest rate changes. They base their decision on the idea that a central bank has mainly three options to respond to speculative attacks: In order to stabilize the exchange rate the bank can either augment the interest rate or sell international reserves. A third option would be to let market forces work and thus the currency devaluate. All three components are included in the EMPI of BF. Aiming to avoid sample splits due to hyperinflation periods, they concentrate on the real effective instead of the nominal exchange rates (REER). Accordingly, they 9 Results of the univariate indicators' performance assessment are not explicitly displayed here but can be summed up to the following aspects: First, again, the real exchange rate variable stays the top performer over all variations, while CA / GDP performs worst. Second, the six variables mainly keep their performance relative to each other. Third, as noise-to-signal ratios worsen to a great ex-consider real interest rates (r). The single components are weighted with their inverse sample variance over all countries for the whole period: the higher the variance, the smaller their weight. Originally, a crisis is considered a period when the EMPI is at least two standard deviations above its country average. for the shorter and 101 crises for the larger sample respectively. Detected crisis times in the expanded sample match, to a great extent, those identified in the small sample and only miss out few of the latter. In two countries (Portugal and South Africa) no crisis period at all can be detected. These countries are thus dropped from further BF analyses. Table 6 (columns 3 and 5) unveils the in-and out-of-sample performance of the logit model when using the BF definition. 11 Both in-and out-of-sample, the percentage of crises correctly called is lower than those using the KLR (see Table 3 for tent with additional countries and time extensions, results support the assumption that the more (heterogeneous) countries examined, the more difficult it gets to reach meaningful signals. 10 For our reconstruction we slightly modify the definition by taking real exchange rates. Furthermore, when trying to reproduce the results of BF, we find a 2.5 standard deviation to be most appropriate. 11 Similar to the former assessment of the definition of FR, results of the univariate analysis are not explicitly shown here. They can be summarized as follows: The real exchange rate once more stays top performer over all variations whereas export growth performs worst. The other four indicators slightly vary their performance relative to each other but generally noise-to-signal ratios proof to be stable to extensions over time and countries.
comparison) and the FR definition respectively. At the same time, false alarms are comparable or even higher.
To conclude, the definition of BF shows a high stability over time and country variations. Admittedly, as EMPI variances are calculated over the whole sample period, the crisis definition seems less sensitive to country specific characteristics. Performance results, however, especially the percent of crises correctly called, are not fully convincing. Furthermore, restricted data availability and the lack of consistency in the interest rate data should be taken into account when choosing the BF definition. 
Further lessons for improving forecasts
Regional sample splits
The KLR sample comprises a very heterogeneous set of countries. Applying the FR definition has shown that different types of crisis seem to be attributable to different countries. We thus analyze the robustness of former results with the help of the KLR crisis definition and the expanded sample across three different regions: Latin America, Asia and Europe.
As before, we focus exclusively on the multivariate approach. 12 The outcome is shown in Table 7 . Latin American results, in-and out-of-sample, outperform those of 12 Regional performance results of the individual indicators are not explicitly displayed here but can be resumed briefly. All three regions have the top indicator in common: It is once more the exchange rate variable. All the same, differences across the regions become also evident with one aspect which is worth mentioning: all Latin American variables display consistently better noise-to-signal ra-the other two regions. Especially out-of-sample, an explicit application of the presented model on Asia or Europe does not seem to make sense as crisis periods are no longer recognized and in Europe even false alarms skyrocket. Taking into account that the FR crisis definition, relying exclusively on the exchange rate, recognizes more Latin American crises than the other two definitions, and the real exchange rate variable proves its star performer quality one more time, results are not surprising.
To conclude, deviations between different regions exist. In order to improve an EWS' forecasting performance while still relying on a broad set of countries considered, some of the regional commonality might also be brought to an EWS by adding a regional dummy variable.
Shortening the sample
We continue our robustness analyses with a split in time dimension. Based on Choueiri and Kaminsky (1999) , who find supporting evidence for a change in the na- tios than in Europe and Asia. These results are in line with Edison (2003) who assesses differences between Asia and Latin America and also gets clearly better performance results for the latter.
Grasping contagion
The idea of capturing the risk of one country being affected by another country's crisis -either due to regional proximity (like the experience of the Asian crisis of 1997 has shown) or because of similar characteristics that seem to overcome regional distance (e.g. the affection of Russia by the Tequila crisis in 1994) -is one of the subjects given the most emphasis in current research on financial crisis. Efforts to characterize, to prove and to analyze financial contagion are numerous (for a survey, see Moser, 2003 , Karolyi, 2003 or Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh, 2003 . Mainly three channels of transmission can be identified in the literature: Firstly, effects can spill over due to bilateral or multilateral trade linkages (see Wyplosz, 1996, Glick and Rose, 1999) . Secondly, those countries either exposed to the same environmental conditions and shocks (see Masson, 1999, Moreno and Trehan, 2000) , or having economic and political similarities (see Sachs, Tonell, Velasco, 1996, Hartmann, Straetmans and de Vries, 2004) are more likely to experience a crisis with one another. The third channel consists in tight financial linkages, arguing e.g. that investors might adjust their portfolio allocation in case of a financial crisis in one country. Having the same major creditors in common with the crisis country could thus lead to higher vulnerability in the respective country as well (see Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000 , Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001 , or Caramazza, Ricci and Salgado, 2004 . A thorough assessment of how to measure and include contagion in EWSs is offered by Fratzscher (2003) .
In order to assess possible effects on performance results, we add two contagion variables to our analyses, one for capturing global, the other for regional linkage.
In contrast to other studies, however, which consider quite complex measures of financial and real contagion, we decide to lighten the gathering of contagion. We therefore rely on Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996) and construct the new variables in the following manner:
The contagion variable takes the value of one, if in another country of the sample or another country of the region, respectively, a currency crisis occurs; otherwise it takes the value of 0. Table 9 shows the results of our logit model estimation including contagion.
Only the regional contagion variable is significant at the 1 % level and its inclusion seems to improve the estimated logit model slightly. Table 10 confirms this assumption. Taking a look at the in-and out-of-sample performance of two logit alternatives with and without contagion, the trade-off between a slightly higher percentage of correctly called crises at the cost of slightly more false alarms is often recognizable. In one out of our cases, however, there is an unequivocal improvement.
We conclude that the inclusion of a simple contagion dummy based on geographic proximity can capture some country linkages and induced contagion risks to improve model performance. Therefore, the possibility of grasping contagion should not be ignored when constructing an EWS.
Conclusions
Financial crises are among the most unwanted manifestations of the present international financial markets. Thus, much emphasis has been given to the develop- We assess the appropriateness of competing approaches by taking the viewpoint of a user who has two requirements which seem to be self-evident: Any EWS applied should be robust and the approach has to be practical. Under these condi-tions we come to five insights: First, EWSs are useful as they help to identify and even forecast fundamental origins of currency crises. Second, the crisis definition should not be too narrow and not too complicated, which is why we favor the KLR definition. Third, multivariate methods underlying EWSs do not differ too much regarding their performance, but a binary logit model seems slightly superior to others and at the same time easy to handle. Fourth, there is contagion in international financial markets and a practical way to roughly capture this effect is adding a regional contagion variable to the set of fundamental variables. Fifth, instability in fundamental relations can be addressed by downsizing samples, for example, by the application of regional or time period restrictions. This will help to get somewhat better results.
Overall, it may be useful to put the research on EWSs into a broader perspective: What we try to achieve here is to forecast larger exchange rate changes by applying a fundamental model. Empirical exchange rate research has shown, however, that rewards to this task can only be meager, as there are no reliable exchange rate models for horizons up to a year or even longer (Sarno and Taylor, 2002) . Seen from this perspective, the performance of EWSs is surprisingly good. An intuitive explanation may understand this as an analogy to the finding that fundamentals matter for exchange rates as well in the case of a huge inflation differential between countries (Frankel and Rose, 1996a) . This analogy, however, indicates a reverse side to the coin: the impact of fundamental influences is mostly complex, i.e. exchange rates do not always adjust immediately to even huge inflation differentials, and if fundamental imbalances become very obvious, markets react and fundamentals do not have forecasting power anymore.
Consequently, the forecasting power of any EWS must be quite limited, as is the case with its robustness, too. One may be tempted to fine-tune EWSs more and more but our results provide evidence against high expectations in this respect. Instead, it seems advisable to be aware of the structural instability in this field and to practice the robust and practical insights that can be gained from earlier work. Notes: (1) The graphs show the deviation in course of the respective variable in a 24-months window before and after the crisis from its average value in calm periods. Results are calculated concentrating on the original KLR sample, but they are similar when enlarging the sample to 28 countries as presented later on (see 2.3). Except for M2 / reserves (level) and CA / GDP (level) as well as the real exchange rate, the variables indicate growth rates in reference to the same month of the previous year. The real exchange rate is expressed as deviation of its deterministic trend. (5) The conditional probability indicates the probability of a crisis in a 24 months window after the respective indicator issued a signal. Notes: (1) Exports and reserves are expressed as growth rates in reference to the respective month of the previous year, whereas M2 / reserves is a level consideration. The real exchange rate is expressed as deviation of its deterministic trend. Notes: (1) ) The period from January 1970 to April 1995 is considered as in-sample. The out-of-sample period ranges from May 1995 to December 2002. (2) In order to assure comparability, the composite Indicator contains the same 4 variables that enter the logit models. (3) A crisis signal is considered as correct, if the estimated crisis probability is above the cut-off probability, and a crisis is coming up in the next 24 months. (4) A false alarm is an observation where the estimated crisis probability is above the cut-off probability, but no crisis is coming up in the next 24 months. (5) A signal for a tranquil period is considered as correct, if the estimated crisis probability is underneath the cut-off probability, and no crisis is coming up in the next 24 months. Notes: (1) As in Table 3 . (2) The independent variables enter the binomial and the multinomial logit model in binary 0-1 form. Calculations with independent variables entering in form of continuous values reveal weaker results and are thus not explicitly considered here. (3) Shortening the considered time windows to 12 months before and after the crisis, respectively, disclose similar, though even slightly worse results that are not shown here. (4)-(6) Analogous to Table 3 , Notes (3)-(5). Notes: (1) As in Table 3 . (2) The expanded KLR sample is split into three regional sub samples. "Latin America" covers Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela, "Asia" contains India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan, Sri Lanka as well as Singapore, and Denmark, Finland, Greece, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Spain and Turkey are considered separately as "Europe". Israel and South Africa are dropped from consideration. (3)-(5) As in Table 3 . 1970-1995 1970-2002 2 1970-1980 1981-1990 1991-2002 2 
